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Abstract Electricity utilities are key players for pro-
moting energy efficiency (EE) because of their close
link to consumers. Utility-centered EE policy frame-
works, such as white certificate schemes coupled to
saving obligations, have been shown to be both effective
and efficient in several US states and various European
countries. In Switzerland, where such a policy frame-
work is absent on a national level, large differences
occur among utility providers in their activities to pro-
mote EE. This study sheds light on this issue, using data
from a survey of Swiss utilities (N=114). A two-step
cluster analysis was used to identify three groups of
utilities. It is based on these utilities’ evaluation of 20
incentives and constraints for promoting EE. An analy-
sis of variance found significant differences between the
clusters regarding size (number of employees), share of
production, number of large clients, and—most impor-
tantly—level of activity in implementing EE programs.
The most active cluster comprises mainly larger utility
companies, which primarily see the incentives of pro-
moting EE. The passive cluster consists of small com-
panies, focusing primarily on constraints. There is also
an ambivalent cluster. It includes middle-sized compa-
nies, which see both clear incentives and many con-
straints – mainly a lack of human and capital re-
sources—for engaging in EE. Based on our analysis,
we conclude that due to the large heterogeneity of Swiss
utilities, there is a need for contextualized policies
targeting different types of utilities in order to effectively
promote EE.
Keywords Energy efficiency. Utilities . Cluster
analysis . Switzerland
Introduction
After the accident at the Japanese Fukushima Daiichi
nuclear power plant in March 2011, Switzerland decid-
ed to phase out nuclear power production. In order to
accomplish this objective, the Swiss government devel-
oped a new energy strategy. A key pillar of this strategy
is the more efficient use of electricity in order to reduce
the domestic per capita demand by about 20 % until
2050 compared to 1990 levels (Swiss Federal Council
2013). In addition to helping to reduce the gap between
supply and demand, the promotion of energy efficiency
(EE) is important to curb carbon emissions (Ürge-
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Vorsatz and Metz 2009), to minimize other negative
environmental impacts caused by the production of
electricity, such as land use (Fthenakis and Kim 2009),
and to ensure the security of supply in the face of the
world’s rising demands for energy (Yergin 2006).
With respect to the practical implementation of EE
measures, energy companies with a retail function have
been identified as key actors because of their extensive
knowledge of and strong link to consumers (Pavan
2012). Hence, utilities1 have become the focus of
policymakers. This, for example, is the case in the UK,
where “(…) government policy is strongly, and increas-
ingly, geared towards using energy suppliers as agents
for demand reduction, as they have been the agents for
getting efficiency measures into homes” (Pyrko and
Darby 2011, p. 401). Also in the new Swiss energy
strategy, utilities are expected to play a key role for
reaching national energy efficiency targets (Swiss Fed-
eral Council 2013). However, there is a fundamental
conflict between utilities’ role as promoters of EE and
their traditional business models, as their revenue is
proportionally linked to their energy sales. In order to
overcome this so-called throughput incentive, many
governments have established policy frameworks that
alter utilities’ commercial logic by decoupling their
revenues and sales (Sullivan et al. 2011; Zarnikau
2012). One prominent example of this is the US state
of California (see, for example, Kaufman and Palmer
2012).
Most of these policy frameworks comprise a mecha-
nism for setting utility-specific saving obligations, i.e.,
quantitative and clearly defined EE targets set by a
regulatory body. Such saving obligations may “be
coupled with various trading options” (Bertoldi and
Resessy 2009, p. 4). Out of these options, white certif-
icates—certified tradable energy savings—have re-
ceived particular of attention in scientific literature. Sev-
eral empirical studies in various EU countries (Bertoldi
et al. 2010; Giraudet et al. 2012; Mundaca 2008;
Suerkemper et al. 2012) and in Australia (Crossley
2008) have assessed the performance of such policy
frameworks that make use of white certificates. There
is a wide agreement that these can contribute to a cost-
efficient reduction of energy consumption. However, to
ensure a level playing field for all market partici-
pants, such a decoupling framework requires both a
consistent legal basis on a national or at least re-
gional level, as well as an administrative body that
has adequate resources to monitor the system and its
participants.
Since these conditions do not apply to Switzerland,
the implementation of such a decoupling framework on
a national level is not yet in place. But even despite this
lack of such a framework, there are some Swiss utilities
that currently provide a broad range of services to en-
courage their customers in becoming more efficient,
while others are very passive (Swiss Federal Council
2013). One reason for this disparity could be the highly
fragmented Swiss electricity market, consisting of
roughly 800 heterogeneous utilities. These range from
small local companies with annual retail electricity sales
of less than 1 GWh to large, regionally active companies
selling more than 8,000 GWh every year. Swiss utilities
also differ in terms of their degree of vertical integration.
While some own significant generation capacities, most
are merely resellers of electricity. Furthermore, while the
transmission grid is owned by the Swiss transmission
system operator, most of the distribution grid is owned
by local utilities. Hence, no clear distinction between
suppliers and distributors can bemade in Switzerland. A
reason for this is the Swiss electricity retail market,
whose liberalization process is still in an intermediary
stage. Only since 1 January 2009 have customers with
an annual consumption of more than 100,000 kWh been
able to freely choose their electricity supplier. This
option will at the earliest be available to smaller
customers, such as residential ones, from 2015
onwards.
Up to this date, there have only been a few studies on
the possible influences on the utilities’ decisions to
promote EE, and it is unclear how these findings can
be transferred to the Swiss context. These studies have
either had a very narrow focus and did not include
potentially relevant characteristics of the utilities (such
as their size), such that by Eurelectric (2011), or they
focused on utilities facing a legal background not com-
parable to that in Switzerland (e.g. Hopper and col-
leagues (2009) or Carley (2012), that both focusing on
North American utilities). Hence, for a better under-
standing of the Swiss case, a more specific study is
needed. This is the goal of the study at hand. First, we
provide an overview of the existing literature to identify
external factors and company characteristics that might
1 In this article, we use the term utilities to refer to electricity
companies with a retail function, regardless of whether they are
as well energy producers or provide other utility services, such as
gas or water.
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act as incentives or constraints for a utility promoting
EE. Based on a large survey of the utilities in Switzer-
land, we then seek reasons why some electricity
utilities promote EE while others do not, even in
the absence of a respective national policy
framework.
Conceptual background
In their analysis of differences among the activities of
utilities for promoting EE, Waide and Buchner (2008, p.
299) refer to two prerequisites for turning “the poachers
into the gamekeepers”: They need to be both motivated
and (financially and organizationally) capable of
implementing an EE program. It is clear that these two
factors are linked—a utility that is motivated to promote
EE is more likely to free the required resources, while an
apparent lack of motivation might outright stifle any
such initiative. Nevertheless, in this study, we attempt
to disentangle these factors by separately addressing the
perceived incentives and constraints of the utilities (to
address their motivations to engage in EE) and their
specific characteristics (to address their capabilities to
implement the necessary measures).
Incentives and constraints of utilities for promoting
energy efficiency
The incentives and constraints for the promotion of EE
by utilities have been the focus of a wide range of
scientific literature, which we present below. To enable
a clear overview, we have structured them according to
five categories that served as the basis for the design of
our survey (see “Utilities’ activity to promote energy
efficiency” section).
Policy framework is a key motivation as it can alter
the commercial logic for utilities to engage in EE. The
impact on the utilities’ EE activities may be indirect,
such as a government carbon emission goal, or it can be
quite direct, as in California, where the Public Utility
Commission sets concrete long-term EE goals for
investor-owned utilities (Hopper et al. 2009). In Swit-
zerland, the legal framework is largely the same for all
utilities, but it has been undergoing drastic changes due
to the liberalization of the retail market in 2009. Its
prospects are uncertain, as they are linked to the nego-
tiations regarding a better integration of the Swiss elec-
tricity market into that of the European Union, a process
that began in 2010 and is ongoing. According to a
survey of European electricity distribution companies,
an unstable legal framework is a key barrier for the
promotion of EE (Eurelectric 2011).
While demand growth is usually positive for utilities’
revenues, it can also present a number of challenges
(Hopper et al. 2009; Zarnikau 2012). Of these, ensuring
the availability of electricity, either by increasing pro-
duction or by purchasing it from external suppliers, is
small compared to the efforts needed to prevent grid
congestion during high demand periods. Therefore, util-
ities exposed to projected demand growth by their cus-
tomers are more likely to adopt EE measures to reduce
necessary investments in the distribution system. Due to
Switzerland’s tight rate-of-return regulation for in-
vestments in the electricity grid, demand growth
could be a relevant incentive for Swiss utilities to
promote EE.
If a utility regards EE programs as an opportunity to
better position itself in the market (e.g., by improving its
access to customers or by developing new lines of
business such as contracting models), it will be more
motivated to actively promote EE (Pyrko and Darby
2011). In these cases, the promotion of EE can be
regarded as a strategic investment to gain a competitive
advantage (Cooremans 2011)2. However, if a utility
decides to maintain its traditional business model, either
because it wants to avoid the risk of investment or
because it does not have the resources to develop a
new one, the resulting conflict with the goals of the EE
programs will strongly inhibit their implementation.
Another major factor is a utility’s expectations re-
garding the financial performance of EE programs. On
the one hand, this is linked to the high investments and
long-term obligations required for certain EE programs
(Eurelectric 2011) such as contracting models. On the
other hand, it is also influenced by the difficulty in
tracking the performance of EE programs in both ener-
getic and financial terms (Vine et al. 2012).
Last, but certainly not least, a major incentive for a
utility to engage in an EE program ismarketing. Energy
issues are currently high on the agenda of both
policymakers and the media, and thus of public interest.
Being perceived as “green” may thus significantly
2 Although Cooremans does not explicitly address energy utilities
but rather focuses on companies in general, her argument is still
valid, as EE programs might be a strategic means for utilities to set
them apart from competitors.
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improve a company’s public image (Cooremans 2011)
and attract new or different customers.
Company characteristics influencing its promotion
of energy efficiency
Whether a utility is capable of implementing an EE
program depends on its characteristics. One key charac-
teristic might be the size of the company, since this
reflects its financial and human resources as well as
the marketing and engineering know-how to implement
EE activities efficiently (Waide and Buchner 2008).
This is only possible if the company has resources in
excess of those needed to execute its core business and
is thus able to adapt to changing business environments,
which is usually referred to as organizational slack (see,
for example, Tan and Peng 2003). Because the average
Swiss utility is small, size might be of particular rele-
vance to them, as a study on the challenges of partial
electricity market liberalization for Swiss utilities sug-
gests (Sonderegger 2005).
Its legal form may also be a relevant factor in deter-
mining how well a company is capable of implementing
EE measures, as it may strongly influence internal
decision-making processes. This is linked to the owner-
ship of the utility. A North American study showed, for
example, that investor-owned utilities have higher ener-
gy saving targets than others (Hopper et al. 2009), and
another study found that municipal utilities are less
likely to participate in EE programs than private ones
or cooperatives (Carley 2012). The reason for this dif-
ference might be more stringent regulations or that the
utilities set up as companies instead of administrations
have a stronger incentive to strategically position them-
selves in a liberalized market. However, there are dif-
ferent views on the effect of utility ownership and its
activity in promoting EE. Vojdani (2008), for instance,
claimed that for investor-owned utilities in the United
Stated, energy conservation usually has a rather low
priority. The argument can even be made that publicly
owned utilities promote EE more actively because gov-
ernments use them as direct means to reach political
goals, such as the recent evaluation of an EE program
that was part of a political energy reduction plan
(Cabrera et al. 2012). Although these findings might
not be directly applicable to the Swiss context, legal
form and ownership might still be relevant factors for
explaining differences in the promotion of EE.
With regard to the share of own production of the
electricity sold to customers, Swiss utilities differ great-
ly. While most are re-sellers of electricity, some have
considerable power production capacities. Especially
those companies that cover all of the demand with their
own production or those that are even net exporters have
the adequate know-how in selling their excess electric-
ity. At the same time, they have an incentive to promote
EE activities of their customers as this increases the
amount of electricity that they can sell to other utilities.
As most Swiss utilities with own production capacities
have hydropower plants and as most of their customers
are still in fixed tariff models, these companies may
expect to realize higher returns if they sell their excess
electricity on the retail market, at least during peak
hours.
Data base and study design
Sample and procedure
We base our analysis on data collected among 296
Swiss electricity utilities in an online survey con-
ducted between May 25 and June 12, 2012. It was
translated and distributed in all three official Swiss
languages (German, French and Italian, see Table S1,
Electronic supplementary material (ESM), for more
information). The invitation, as well as two reminders
(after 1 and 2 weeks), were sent out by e-mail to all those
members of the Association of Swiss Electricity Com-
panies (VSE) (German: Verband Schweizerischer
Elektrizitätsunternehmen), whose main business is the
supply of electricity to consumers. The rest of the VSE
members were not included, as these are primarily pro-
ducers of electricity without a direct link to consumers.
Although not all Swiss utilities are members of VSE,
their members’ sales account for the vast majority of the
Swiss electricity retail market, since most of the non-
member utilities are very small in size.
Of 296 utilities, 114 (38.5 %) responded. Of these, 13
were excluded from further analysis due to missing data
(dropouts). This response rate is comparable to that of
other utility surveys conducted in Switzerland (e.g.
Cometta et al. 2010; Sonderegger and Schedler 2010;
Laager et al. 2009). Size distributions of the responding
companies are similar to the study conducted by
Sonderegger and Schedler (2010, see Fig. S1 in the
ESM for details). The overall amount of electricity sold
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to end-consumers in 2011 by the participating compa-
nies was about 34 TWh3. Compared to the overall Swiss
power consumption of 58.6 TWh in the same year (BFE
2012), our sample covers almost 60 % of the volume of
the Swiss electricity market.
The survey consisted of three parts. In the first part,
the utilities were asked to indicate their activities for
promoting energy efficiency of their customers (see
“Utilities’ activity to promote energy efficiency” sec-
tion). The second required them to provide their per-
spective on incentives and constraints to engage in such
activities (see “Perceived incentives and constraints”
section), and the third part inquired about the specific
characteristics of these companies (see “Utility charac-
teristics” section).
Utilities’ activity to promote energy efficiency
There is no ideal measure for a utility’s activity in
improving their customers’ EE. But in survey studies
in particular, it is important to have a standardized and
hence comparable basis. Therefore, we used the com-
panies’ different activities to support their customers in
becomingmore energy efficient as a dependent variable.
Hence, in the survey, we provided a list of nine different
energy efficiency services and the respondents were
asked to check which of them their company offered.
We made sure to include all EE services that had been
established by at least some Swiss utilities by having
two experts validate the list.
Using that data, we computed the EE performance of
a utility PEE (see Eq. 1) as a weighted sum of all services
offered pEE,i. The weighting wi reflects the assumed
relative effectiveness of these services with regard to
energy efficiency improvements and achieves a normal-
ization. Thus, PEE may range between 0 and 100. This
accounts for the fact that, for example, offering tariff
incentives for customers who reduce their energy con-
sumption is more effective than only providing infor-
mation material. The weights of the different measures
were derived from the evaluations of an expert panel
(N=9). The panel included two representatives of the
Swiss Federal Office of Energy, one energy consultant,
one researcher, and five CEOs of electricity utilities. As
all of these five CEOs manage companies that had
participated in the survey, we were able to ensure that
a broad spectrum of perspectives was represented (i.e.,
utilities of different sizes, degrees of energy efficiency
activity and regions).
PEE ¼
X
i¼1
9
wi ⋅ pEE;i ð1Þ
We used a scale ranging from 1 (no real effect, only
“window dressing”) to 7 (significant effect, may help to
reduce a consumer’s electricity consumption by up to
15 %). As a reference for the upper end of the scale, we
used a report by Nabe et al. (2009) for the German
Bundesnetzagentur (the regulatory body for electricity,
gas, telecommunications, post and railway markets), in
which tariff agreements were estimated as an EE service
with a saving potential of 13 to 20 % of a consumer’s
demand. The list of services, the average effectivity
rating (M) by the experts, the standard deviation (SD)
and the resulting weights for this study are presented in
Table 1. For a more detailed overview of the experts’
answers, please see Fig. S4 of the additional material.
3 We estimated this number based on data published in the annual
reports and on the websites of these utilities.
Table 1 Services adopted by Swiss utilities to promote energy
efficiency
M SD Weight
(%)
Tariff agreements for large clientsa 5.9 1.0 15.5
Tariff incentivesb 5.8 1.6 15.2
Development of lighting concepts for
customers
5.4 1.2 14.2
Promotion of efficient appliances
(e.g., by providing financial bonuses)
4.4 1.6 11.6
Energy audits 4.3 1.3 11.3
Raising awareness by distributing energy
meters
3.8 1.2 9.9
Organization of public events
(e.g., booth at exhibitions)
3.0 1.5 7.8
Providing information material
(in print and/or online)
2.9 2.0 7.7
Efficiency consulting by phone
(e.g., hotline)
2.6 1.4 6.8
Sum 100
a This refers (but is not limited) to a specific program offered by
some Swiss utilities in which large consumers are given a detailed
free energy audit. Based on this audit, binding energy saving
targets are set in exchange for a lower electricity tariff
b This refers (but is not limited) to a specific program offered by
some Swiss utilities, under which all their customers get a refund
of their previous years’ electricity bill if they have managed to
reduce that years’ consumption by a certain percentage
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Perceived incentives and constraints
In the survey, the utilities had been asked to provide
their perspective on factors that both encouraged or
discouraged them from promoting energy efficiency
(i.e., their perceived incentives and constraints). Table 2
provides an overview of all variables used in the study. It
consists of 20 binary (yes/no) variables, of which 10
refer to incentives and 10 to constraints. The selection of
incentives and constraints was based on the categories
presented in “Incentives and constraints of utilities for
promoting energy efficiency” section and on a Swiss
study conducted by Laager et al. (2009), which suggests
that particularly for many smaller Swiss utilities the lack
of resources might be quite a relevant barrier. Therefore,
we have added a sixth category with four constraint
items that refer to a lack of resources for implementing
EE measures.
Utility characteristics
In order to characterize the utilities with regard to their
capabilities to implement EE programs we have been
using the following four variables:
& We chose to measure utility size by the number of
employees, as this is a better indicator of organiza-
tional capacity than the amount of electricity sold to
customers. We expected that the EE performance of
utilities increases with the number of their em-
ployees, due to their greater organizational slack.
& The legal form has been included as a binary vari-
able. It separates utilities that are part of a local
administration from those who have other legal
forms. From the latter group, most are incorporated
companies that are owned by communities. But it
also includes some privately owned incorporated
companies as well as some very few cooperatives.
Being aware that there are diverging opinions on
this issue in literature, we expected utilities set up as
companies instead of administrations to have a
higher EE performance than the others, as they have
a stronger interest in positioning themselves strate-
gically in the developing Swiss electricity market.
& We also expected the EE performance of a utility to
increase with its share of produced electricity. For
one, this is an indicator of organizational know-how
of the electricity market. Furthermore, in times of
rising market prices, being able to sell any excess
electricity is attractive. This is especially true for
peak hours, as Swiss utilities’ production portfolio
primarily consists of hydropower plants and most
customers pay fixed tariffs.
& The number of large clients (consuming more than
100 MWh/a of electricity) has been included as a
measure of a utility’s market exposure. We expected
that a high market exposure increases the pressure
on utilities to offer EE services to these large cus-
tomers and to at least consider EE as a means of
positioning themselves in the electricity market,
which is developing in Switzerland. We furthermore
assume that utilities that have made such strategic
reflections are likely to have identified at least
some low-threshold measures, which they then
implement.
Table 2 List of incentives and constraints included in the survey
structured according to six broad categories
Category Item Mechanism
Resources Lack of personnel Constraint
Lack of time Constraint
Lack of know-how Constraint
Lack of capital Constraint
Policy
framework
Lack of adequate legal framework Constraint
Meeting political goals Incentive
Demand growth Reducing dependence from
electricity suppliers
Incentive
Reducing capital expenditure
for grid upgrades
Incentive
Reducing capital expenditure
for new production capacities
Incentive
Positioning Not a goal of the corporate
strategy
Constraint
Leader is pushing the topic
of EE
Incentive
Meeting corporate goals Incentive
Low priority in corporate strategy Constraint
Prospects of starting a new
business line
Incentive
Improving access to customers Incentive
Financial
performance
EE programs yield too little
financial return
Constraint
Difficult to track the performance
of EE programs
Constraint
Marketing Acquiring new customers Incentive
Improving the companies’ image Incentive
A utility is not a credible promoter
of EE
Constraint
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Statistical analysis
We first show some main characteristics of our sample
of utilities, as well as the results of a linear regression
analysis, in order to get some first insights into how
these might be linked to EE performance. We then
present the results of a cluster analysis that yielded three
groups of utilities with similar perspectives on incen-
tives and constraints for promoting EE. We used an
analysis of variance (ANOVA) to determine whether
any significant differences exist among these clusters.
Finally, we applied an analysis of co-variance
(ANCOVA) in order to allow for a closer look on the
interactions of several variables in explaining the vari-
ances in EE performance among the utilities.
Overview of the sample of Swiss electricity utilities
The utilities in our sample are quite heterogeneous, and
differ in size, number of large clients, and share of
production. This is visible in Table 3, which shows
means (M), standard deviation (SD), minimum (min)
and maximum (max) values for the EE performance,
number of large clients, share of production (in percent)
and number of employees of our sample of Swiss util-
ities (N=101). Also with respect to PEE there are large
differences between the companies: while some provide
a wide range of services, others do not offer any at all.
With regard to legal form, there is an almost even split
between those that are part of an administration (n=53)
and others (n=48) that are not.
Linear regression
Using a linear regression analysis, we have analyzed the
influence of four utility characteristics on their EE per-
formance. We found a significant effect for both the
number of employees and the legal form, meaning
that a large, incorporated utility is more likely to have
a high PEE score than a small one that is part of an
administration. However, no effect could be found for
the number of large clients and utilities’ share of pro-
duction (see Table 4). In our sample, there are two
utilities that have a considerably higher number of em-
ployees than all the others and thus dominate the regres-
sion with regards to company size. When removing
these two outliers, the effect of this variable became
even more pronounced and none of the others were
significant any longer (for more details we refer to the
Table S2 of the ESM). From the regression analysis, it
becomes clear that the four company characteristics
chosen for our analysis only explain a minor share of
variance in EE performance.
Cluster analysis
We applied a cluster analysis to identify groups of
utilities that have similar incentives and constraints in
promoting EE. A two-step procedure was chosen be-
cause the clustering was based on the 20 binary incen-
tives and constraints variables. This method is based on
a data clustering algorithm developed by Tian et al.
(1997), which is capable of handling categorical vari-
ables (SPSS Inc. 2001). We used Schwarz's Bayesian
criterion for the automatic determination of the number
of clusters, which yielded three clusters.
The three groups of utilities derived from the cluster
analysis were labeled active, passive, and ambivalent.
This is based on the companies’ profiles of their per-
spectives on the 20 incentives and constraints for en-
gaging in energy efficiency (see Figs. 1 and 2).
The active cluster contains 35 utilities. They primar-
ily focus on incentives to promote EE (on average, 4.3
out of the 10 potential incentives applied to them, stan-
dard deviation=1.5), whereas the constraints are clearly
less relevant to them (M=2.3, SD=1.0). Its members
have the highest approval rate for most of the incentives
Table 3 Overview of sample of Swiss utilities
M SD Min Max
EE performance [PEE] 36.2 20.1 0 88.4
Number of large clients 69.4 101.1 0 500
Share of production [%] 16.8 31.3 0 140
Number of employees 54.8 109.7 1 746
Table 4 Results of the regression analysis with respect to utilities’
EE performance
B Std. error b β t
Number of employees 0.05 0.02 0.28* 2.561
Number of large clients 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.129
Share of production [%] 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.016
Legal form 0.05 3.92 0.23* 2.311
R2 =0.14
*p<0.05
Energy Efficiency (2014) 7:697–710 703
Fig. 1 Shares of utilities for which the 10 incentives were relevant, presented by cluster
Fig. 2 Shares of utilities for which the 10 constraints were relevant, presented by cluster
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and the lowest for most constraints. The only variables
that deviated from this pattern were the motivation
leader is pushing the topic as well as the two constraints
lack of adequate policy framework and EE programs
yield too little returns (see Figs. 1 and 2). The cluster of
active utilities also has the highest average EE perfor-
mance (see Fig. 3). Compared to the others, the active
cluster has a relatively high share of incorporated com-
panies (69 %).
The passive cluster is the largest of the three, con-
taining 41 utilities. It is immediately apparent that these
companies perceive only few incentives to promote EE
(M=1.5, SD=0.9) and consequently hold the lowest
average approval rate for most of these items (see
Fig. 1). The average sum of constraints is as high as that
for the active cluster (M=2.3, SD=1.5), but displays a
different pattern (see Fig. 2). For example, these utilities
rate lack of personnel and lack of time much higher
(although not as high as the ambivalent cluster). The
passive utilities had the lowest average EE performance
of all clusters (see Fig. 3) and compared to the others,
also had a relatively low share of incorporated compa-
nies (29 %).
The cluster of ambivalent utilities is the smallest of
the three, containing 25 companies. These are charac-
terized by their rather high approval of both the incen-
tives (M=3.2, SD=1.2) and the constraints (M=4.2, SD=
1.8) items. Their primary concern is the general lack of
resources necessary for implementing EE programs. The
average EE performance of utilities in the ambivalent
cluster is higher than that of the passive cluster, but also
significantly smaller than that of the active cluster (see
Fig. 3). Compared to the cluster of active utilities, the
ambivalent cluster has a slightly lower share of incorpo-
rated companies (48%), which roughly corresponds to the
overall sample average.
Differences between the clusters
An ANOVAwas applied to check for significant differ-
ences between the clusters with regard to their EE
performance, number of employees, number of large
clients, and share of production. Because Levene’s test
of homogeneity of variances was significant (p<0.001)
for all these variables except the first, a Games-Howell
post hoc test was performed for all of them, which is
both adequate for dealing with heterogeneous variances
and robust for clusters of different sizes (Field 2009).
Table 5 shows the results of the ANOVA.We found a
significant main effect for “cluster” for all variables. The
post-hoc test revealed a number of significant differ-
ences among the clusters. An outstanding pattern
showed that the cluster of active utilities differs signif-
icantly from the other two clusters with regard to EE
performance and number of employees, having the
highest mean in both of them. Furthermore, with regards
to the number of large clients it significantly differs from
the ambivalent ones and with regards to the share of
production it differs significantly from the passive ones.
Utilities from the passive and ambivalent clusters are
less distinct, displaying no significant differences in any
of the four variables.
Factors influencing the energy efficiency performance
and their interaction
The significant main effect for “cluster” indicates differ-
ences between clusters regarding EE performance. Using
an ANCOVA, we have examined the effect of cluster
membership on EE performance. In doing so, we have
controlled for the number of employees, number of large
clients, and share of production (co-variates). As in theFig. 3 Interaction effect between cluster membership and legal form
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regression analysis, also legal form displayed a sig-
nificant effect we have included it as a further factor
in the analysis.
Table 6 displays the main results of the ANCOVA.
Overall, the model explains about one third of the var-
iance in EE performance. Neither of the covariates nor
legal form revealed a significant main effect. This indi-
cates that all these variables are not significantly related
to EE performance when controlling for cluster mem-
bership and legal form. With respect to the clusters we
found a significant main effect, F (2, 92)=10.63,
p<0.001. This main effect was qualified by an interac-
tion effect among cluster membership and legal form, F
(2, 92)=3.81, p<0.05, i.e., the effect of legal form on EE
varied with cluster membership (see Fig. 3). It indicates
that for utilities that are part of an administration cluster
membership has a more pronounced effect on their EE
performance than for utilities with other legal forms
(e.g., incorporated companies). Performing particularly
well are utilities of the active cluster that are part of an
administration.
Discussion
Discussion of the findings
In this study, we have identified three clusters of Swiss
utilities based on their perspectives of the incentives and
constraints for implementing EE programs. The subse-
quent ANOVA revealed a link between these perspec-
tives and average EE performance, size, share of pro-
duction, and number of large customers. The fact that
the more active companies are, on average, larger also
corresponds to the results of other general studies of
companies, which found that small and medium enter-
prises pursue reactive environmental strategies mainly
because of a lack of resources (Bianchi and Noci 1998;
Aragón-Correa et al. 2008). This finding is also reflected
in the different ratings of the incentives and constraints
by the utilities in the three clusters.
Regarding the incentives, we would like to focus on
two issues. First, the two most important incentives
overall were improving the company’s image and im-
proving access to customers, whereas the prospect of
starting a new business line and acquiring new cus-
tomers seemed relatively unimportant. However, the
relevance of these items varied by cluster. While the
passive companies rated the former two items markedly
lower, the latter two were quite relevant for the active
companies. These results are plausible in the light of the
ongoing changes in the Swiss electricity market. While
Table 5 Results of the ANOVA, comparing the three clusters
F p Active (n=35) Passive (n=41) Ambivalent (n=25)
M SD M SD M SD
EE performance [PEE] 15.98 0.000 49.1
a,b 18.7 26.2c 15.3 34.3d 19.7
Number of large clients 4.25 0.017 107.6b 140.6 55.0 76.8 39.8d 37.2
Share of production [%] 4.67 0.012 27.5e 36.1 6.4f 17.5 18.6 37.1
Number of employees 10.14 0.000 116.6a,b 168.4 17.7c 21.5 29.3d 24.7
Results of post hoc-tests: a Significantly different from passive (p<0.001); b Significantly different from ambivalent (p<0.05); c Significantly
different from active (p<0.001); d Significantly different from active (p<0.05); e Significantly different from passive (p<0.01);
f Significantly different from active (p<0.01)
Table 6 Results of the ANCOVA with respect to utilities’ EE
performance
Variables df F η
Number of employees (co-variate) 1 1.09 0.12
Number of large clients (co-variate) 1 0.02 0.00
Share of production (co-variate) 1 1.61 0.13
Legal form 1 0.43 0.07
Cluster membership 2 10.36*** 0.43
Legal form x Cluster membership 2 3.81* 0.28
Error 92 (296.89) 0.11
The value enclosed in parentheses represents the mean square
error
R2 =0.33
*p<0.05; ***p<0.001
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the future liberalization offers new business opportuni-
ties to larger utilities with more organizational slack,
there might be a considerable share of utilities that until
now have not had the resources or have not been pushed
by external factors to seriously consider promoting EE.
This is in line with the results of the survey conducted
by Eurelectric (2011), which found that one third of the
polled electricity distribution companies had not deter-
mined whether promoting EE was a business opportu-
nity or an unnecessary burden. The second issue is that
reducing the negative consequences of the growing
energy demands, such as increasing dependency from
suppliers and higher capital expenditure requirements
for production capacities or grid upgrades, did not seem
to trigger the Swiss utilities to promote the EE of their
customers. Moreover, no significant differences be-
tween the clusters were observed regarding that ques-
tion. The reason why this issue is apparently less rele-
vant for Swiss utilities than for those in other countries
such as in the United States (see, for example, Hopper
et al. 2009), could be the currently excellent condition of
the Swiss electricity grid, so that even in times of high
demand problems with outages are minor (Swissgrid
2012).
As to the constraints, we would also like to focus on
two issues. The most relevant constraint was the wide-
spread perception that there is a lack of human re-
sources, resulting in a lack of time and knowledge. This
was especially important for the companies in the am-
bivalent cluster. These companies usually lack the orga-
nizational slack to make the necessary adaptations re-
quired by the ongoing changes in the electricity market.
This finding is in line with the aforementioned study of
Laager et al. (2009), who found that a major constraint
for Swiss utilities, especially small ones, to engage in
EE programs is the lack of financial and human re-
sources. The other issue is that the active and ambivalent
utilities (that is, those who already offer more EE ser-
vices) called for different legal frameworks andmeans to
track the success of the EE programs, which would
reward those utilities that are already promoting
EE, be it financially or through a better public
image.
The results of the ANCOVA suggest that cluster
membership significantly influences utilities’ EE perfor-
mance. This effect depends, in particular, on the
company’s legal form. Utilities belonging to either the
passive group or the ambivalent group had a higher
chance of being more active in promoting EE if they
were incorporated companies. Meanwhile, the opposite
effect could be observed for the active utilities. One
explanation for this pattern may be that incorporated
companies, even small ones, are forced to assess their
market position regularly, whereas those that are part of
an administration have a more or less given mission.
This means that incorporated companies can generally
be faster in adopting EE measures that promise clear
financial gains and an improvement of the companies’
public image (i.e., picking the “low hanging fruits”). But
at the same time, when it comes to offering EE services
that promise no or only marginal returns, both from
a financial and an image perspective, political pres-
sure might be needed to implement them. But this
might only be possible for larger communities,
which usually host larger utilities with an above-
average size, because only these communities have
both adequate financial resources and direct control
of the utilities.
Critical reflections
Before we conclude, we would like to reflect critically
on three points. The first is the selection and measure-
ment of the 20 incentives and constraints items. These
have not only been taken from international sources, but
also strongly focus on the Swiss context. This reduces
the generalizability of the results and the possibility of
linking them to existing scientific literature on barriers
and drivers, which is especially unfortunate with regard
to barriers. A large body of literature already exists on
this topic, which structures them according to theoretical
frameworks (e.g., Weber 1997; Sorrell et al. 2000) and
explicitly addresses the so-called efficiency gap; i.e.,
why more energy is consumed than would be econom-
ically optimal (Jaffe and Stavins 1994). Furthermore, all
items were measured using a binary scale, which makes
the utilities’ profiles, with respect to the incentives and
constraints, less distinct than if rating scales were used.
However, considering that the objective of our study
was specifically to analyze the Swiss situation and
that our analysis yielded clear and plausible re-
sults, this compromise in data collection seems
justified.
The second point concerns the quantification of the
20 incentive and constraint items. Because a broad
spectrum of opinions might have been present in the
companies surveyed, the assessment of the items might
be partially dependent on the personal opinions of the
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respondents. This is not a big concern with regard to the
many small utilities in the survey, which often have less
than ten employees. In these cases, the company’s CEO
usually filled out the survey, which provided a good
representation of the company’s perspective. In the case
of larger companies, this might have been more of an
issue, as one cannot assume that the surveys were filled
out by a manager or member of the board. To lessen the
resulting variance, in the accompanying letter, we asked
that the survey be forwarded to the person responsible
for EE, whose responses could be assumed to represent
the company's views on EE.
The third point is the choice of the dependent vari-
able. Using a binary assessment of companies’ different
activities does not allow for acknowledging the strin-
gency with which they are implemented or, in other
words, the efforts put into them. This might cause a bias
favoring large utilities who can afford to implement a
broader range of measures. And while for specific EE
programs the energy savings can be determined quite
adequately and efficiently by using simple engineering
estimations (Cabrera et al. 2012), there is no single best
way to measure utilities’ performance with regard to EE
in a standardized (and hence comparable) way. As Ho-
rowitz (2011, p. 43) puts it, the challenge lies in mea-
suring “the volume of fuel and energy that would have
been demanded but was not.” Demand projections (for
example, as used in Hopper et al. 2009) are also uncer-
tain, as reduction targets may be set too ambitiously and
the utilities may eventually fail to meet them (Kaufman
and Palmer 2012). Furthermore, an EE performance
assessment based on energy consumption data raises a
number of questions, such as how long the time series
should be and to which baseline it should be compared.
Therefore, our approach of using an expert-weighted
sum of activities seems the most transparent, par-
ticularly considering the amount and accuracy of
data that would be required for a more complex
approach.
Origin to each of these three points of concern was
primarily the tradeoff between the surveys’ length and
its response rate. Because we emphasized the latter, our
survey was kept as short as possible and was limited to
categorical items. Or motivation for doing so was that
for the past years, Swiss utilities have had to cope with a
large number of surveys and inquiries by various gov-
ernmental agencies, industrial bodies, and research in-
stitutions, which has been prompted by the recent liber-
alization of the electricity market for large consumers
and the planned opening for all customers in 2015. The
rather high response rate suggests that our strategy of
using a short questionnaire was effective.
Conclusions
The results of our analysis of Swiss utilities confirm the
findings of previous studies, such as those by Hopper
et al. (2009) and Carley (2012). There is indeed a link
between utilities’ characteristics and their promotion of
EE. This seems to hold true even in the absence of a
national policy framework that aims at decoupling util-
ities’ revenues from their sales of electricity. However,
due to the large heterogeneity of Swiss utilities, the links
found were neither linear nor monocausal. Therefore,
the activity of a utility in promoting EE should be seen
as the result of an interplay among different variables.
For example, we found that company size alone was not
a robust predictor of the utilities’ EE performance.
While a certain size might be a necessary condi-
tion for being an active promoter of EE, it is not
sufficient to explain the variance in the utilities’
behavior, which is possibly also influenced by
other factors, such as the companies’ perceived
incentives and constraints or, as our cluster analy-
sis suggests, by whether they have an active, pas-
sive, or ambivalent perspective regarding the pro-
motion of EE.
Thus, we recommend that future studies examine this
issue in more detail. A better understanding of the
influence of the utilities’ organizational structure and
ownership on their EE strategy would be of special
interests since our results suggest that the effect of legal
form may vary between different types of utilities. Fur-
thermore, to better understand the influence of the dif-
ferent sociotechnical contexts, qualitative comparisons
between the situations in different countries or regions
as well as quantitative international studies that compare
utilities on the basis of a standardized set of parameters
are both necessary.
We conclude with a recommendation for policy-
makers that aim at designating electricity utilities as
agents for promoting EE: If the differences between
the utilities’ characteristics and their experience with
EE programs are as huge as they are in Switzerland,
there certainly is no single best policy. Rather, one
should consider that policies differentially affect distinct
groups of utilities, depending on their available
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resources and their different perspectives regarding in-
centives and constraints for promoting EE. Utilities that
are already quite active in offering EE services will
require further incentives that encourage them to pursue
their current course. One option would be the introduc-
tion of standardized measures and labels for quantifying
energy savings through efficiency programs, which they
could use for marketing purposes. Another potentially
attractive policy measure for these companies would be
the introduction of a national incentive framework, such
as the system of saving obligations coupled with white
certificates, which is foreseen by the new Swiss energy
strategy. However, such an instrument would need to be
designed in a way that previous efforts are acknowl-
edged for. If this is not done, active utilities will be
disadvantaged compared to those who can still pick
some low hanging fruits. Meanwhile, the group of am-
bivalent companies that are mainly constrained by their
lack of staff, time, and knowledge may profit less from
such schemes, as they will face difficulties in complying
with them. While mergers between such companies
might free some of these scarce resources, it will none-
theless be hard to achieve. Many of the utilities are
owned by communities, which would most likely
oppose such consolidation efforts. For them it would
mean to give up some of the power they have held
in the past. Hence, establishing regional intelligence
or competence centers might help ambivalent utili-
ties to overcome their lack of resources. These cen-
ters could provide the regions’ utilities with knowl-
edge and practical support for designing and
implementing standardized and effective EE pro-
grams. Additionally, the many passive utilities,
which sometimes employ no more than a handful
of people, will find it difficult to establish the role of
a change agent in promoting EE primarily due to
their limited resources. If utilities are to play a
prominent role in the implementation of the new
national energy strategy, consolidation seems inevi-
table. This may be supported by the upcoming lib-
eralization of the Swiss electricity retail market for
all consumers, as this will raise the administrative
standards for utilities. Small companies will have a
very hard time keeping up with these.
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